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The Impact of Protest Responses in Choice Experiments
M. Barrio1 and M. L. Loureiro.2

Abstract
No much attention has been given to protest responses in choice experiments (CE).
Using follow-up statements, we are able to identify protest responses and compute
welfare estimates with and without the inclusion of such protest responses. We conclude
that protest responses are fairly common in CE, and their analysis affects the statistical
performance of the empirical models. In particular, when the sample is corrected by
protests, our results come from utility consistent models. Thus, future choice
experiments should consider the role of protest responses as contingent valuation
studies have.
JEL codes: Q01, Q10, Q50
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1. The impact of Protest Responses in Choice Experiments
In the last years, the assessment of environmental and recreational values with choice
experiments (CE) has increased (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Boxall et al., 1996; Hanley et
al., 1998; Morrison et al, 2002). The CE method is a generalization of the contingent
valuation (CV) method, in the sense that rather than asking people to choose between a
baseline scenario and a specific alternative, CE ask people to select between cases that
are described by attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1998). CE share a common theoretical
framework with dichotomous-choice contingent valuation in Random Utility Models
(RUM) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974), as well as a common basis of empirical analysis
with limited dependent variables (Greene, 1997). For these reasons, we look at the
treatment of protest responses in CV, aiming to adopt it to CE.
As the literature has shown, if protesting occurs, stated preference methods may fail to
determine the correct economic value of the good in question (Meyerhoff and Liebe,
2008). The treatment of protest responses becomes particularly important when the
benefit aggregation issue is considered (Halstead et al., 1992), because such protests
may provide underestimated welfare measures if all responses are included in the
analysis (e.g. Hearne and Santos, 2005; Chuan-Zhong et al., 2004); or else,
overestimated results if removal of all the status quo responses of the analysis is done
(e.g. Adamowicz et al. 19983). Therefore, a correct analysis of protest responses seems
required.
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the same as the “I don’t know” response in a CV question.
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Protest responses have been widely debated in CV studies (Strazzera et al., 2003;
Jorgensen et al., 1999, among others), showing that the identification and their later
treatment may have a significant influence on the welfare estimates. Therefore,
problems commonly encountered in CV related to protest responses might also be
present in CE, although not much attention has been given to these issues yet in the
literature.
In CE, in addition to the different attribute combinations which are associated with
some changes in the good or services valued, another option is typically presented to
respondents that contains the current situation and a zero payment, denoted as the status
quo option (Hearne and Santos, 2005; Mercer and Snook, 2004). Protest responses may
hide behind the selection of the status quo options (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Meyerhoff
and Liebe, 2009). Just in the last years, authors such as Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008,
2009) treat more explicitly the topic of protest responses in CE. Meyerhoff and Liebe
(2008) employ a follow up question with CE and CV to differentiate the protest beliefs
and responses, and to assess whether the likelihood of protest responses differs across
methodologies. They do not find clear differences between protests responses in both
methodologies. Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009) analyze the motives to select the status quo
alternative. Furthermore, they assess the impact of the alternative specific constant for
the status quo into the computation of compensating surplus.
The novelty of the analysis that follows is that it is based on the treatment of protest
responses, distinguishing explicitly between protest and non-protest responses based on
the selection of the status quo option. In this way, the indirect utility function and the
associated welfare estimates are computed per treatment.

Therefore, this analysis

3

Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2010

3

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 521 [2010]

allows not only for the assessment of the impact of protest responses on the welfare
estimates, but also on the estimated parameters of the indirect utility function.
In order to properly account for the effect of protest responses, first, a conservative
treatment of protests is employed, treating the protest responses in the analysis as true
zero respondents. In a second approach, protest responses are excluded from the
empirical analysis, under the assumption that individuals who do not share the valuation
scenario should not be taken into account when estimating welfare estimates (Freeman,
1986). As far as we know, this is the first empirical application that explicitly deals with
the treatment of protest responses per se in the context of CE, analyzing two ways to
identify the protests. At the same time, the identification of protesters follows the steps
of the previous works conducted in CV but novel in CE studies. Additionally,
secondary objectives are related to the assessment of the sensitivity of welfare estimates
when including and excluding protest responses, respectively. These analyses seem
necessary due to the propensity to find protest responses in CE.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: first, we conduct a literature review of
previous studies linked to protests responses and their treatment, continuing with the
choice experiment model estimation. It follows with the description of the case study
area and the survey mechanism. Later, we present and compare the results for the whole
sample with the results corrected by protests responses, ending with some conclusions
and recommendations based on the obtained results.

2. Analysis of Protest Responses
Protest respondents are those who oppose or do not approve the survey mechanism and
fail to respond the valuation question, either giving positive responses although invalid,
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or a non-true zero value to a product or service (Halstead et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the
first concern of protest responses appears with respect to their identification. There is no
protocol or theoretical criterion for classifying responses (Boyle and Bergstrom 1999);
however, the classification of all zero bids must be carefully examined to identify the
legitimate zero and protest responses. To differentiate between them, previous analyses
have used a set of debriefing questions that were presented to those respondents who
were unwilling to pay (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 20084, Loomis et al., 1996, Strazzera et
al., 2003). Based on statements as the previously used in the literature, and presented in
Table 1, real zero values and protest responses were also identified in this analysis.

Table 1 around here
As we can observe in Table 1, there are differences related to the presented statements
aiming to classify individuals, but also with respect to the criteria applied to identify a
response as protest. Some authors presented the statements to the full sample
(Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2008), trying to distinguish not only protest responses related to
zero WTP values, but also general protests beliefs in the entire sample. On the contrary,
other studies only presented statements to the individuals who were not willing to pay
(Halstead et al., 1992; Loomis et al., 1996). Furthermore, the criteria to be classified
between protests and true zero values varied considerably between different authors, as
denoted in Table 1, although there are some commonalities across studies. Halstead et
al. (1992) present four statements, including reasons for the rejection of the payment
vehicle, the concept of paying for the good or the impossibility to afford the payment,

4
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and in addition an open ended question. Along the same line, the rest of the authors
include other reasons related to the value of the good, the sense that others should pay
for the program, or that they cannot afford the payment. Giraud et al. (2002), Jakobsson
and Dragun (2001), Loomis et al. (1996), Strazzera et al. (2003) differentiated between
true zero and protest responses, according with the statements of Table 1. The italics
denote the statements identifying protest respondents, while the rest are classified as
true zeros.
Once the protesters had been identified, different treatments were applied to the protest
responses in the CV literature. Generally, there have been three main ways of dealing
with protest zero bids (Halstead et al., 1992). The first consists on eliminating them
from the data set (Freeman, 1986; Mitchell and Carson, 1989). The second includes the
protest bids in the data set and treats them as legitimate zero bids (Giraud et al., 2002).
The third method assigns protest bidders mean WTP values based upon their sociodemographic characteristics, relative to the rest of the sample. Thus, as the literature
shows, both the treatment and identification of protest responses have been quite
different across studies.
Even though there are different ways to deal with protest responses, the most common
application in CV is to delete them from the sample (see Adamowicz et al., 1998;
Morrison, et al., 2000). Strazzera et al. (2003) argue that the rationale for removal of
protest zeros is explained by Freeman´s (1986) with the following statement: “The
person who refuses to state a monetary value on the grounds that it is unethical to do so
or that he has an inherent right to the environmental good must be dropped from the
sample when mean bids are calculated. If a person bids zero on the grounds that he had
an inherent right to the good, the bid is not an indicator of his true valuation”. However

6
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Jorgensen and Syme (2000) considered that protest beliefs were representative of
attitudes towards the valuation process and argued that censoring of protest responses is
unjustified.

In the present application, we use CE for the valuation of various

managements programs to be applied in a natural protected area.

3. Choice Experiments and Estimation
Choice experiment methods are consistent with utility maximization and demand theory
(Bateman et al., 2002). Respondents are asked to choose between different bundles of
(environmental) goods, which are described in terms of their attributes, or
characteristics, and the levels that these take.
According to this framework, the individual i has a utility function (U) of the form:
⎛
⎞
U =V ⎜ X ,S ⎟ +ε =β X + α S +ε
ij ⎝ ij ij ⎠ ij
j i ij
ij

(1)
This indirect utility function can be described as a sum of two components: a
deterministic part (V) and a stochastic part (ε). The first element is a function of the
attributes of the different management programs (X) to be valued and the social
characteristics (S) of the individuals. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and α

j

is another vector of parameters corresponding with the j-th alternative to be selected.
The stochastic element represents unobservable factors on individual choices
independent of the deterministic part.
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A person chooses the alternative k when

u > u for all k ≠ j . Accordingly, with J
ik
ij

choices, the probability of choice k is:
P ( choose k ) = P ⎛⎜ u > u for all k ≠ j ⎞⎟
ij
⎝ ik
⎠

(2)
One of the prevalent models used in the previous literature to model choice behavior has
been the multinomial logit. An assumption of this model is that the error term is
independently and identically distributed (IID). The non-fulfillment of IID implies
violations in the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. This property
states that the ratio of choice probabilities between two alternatives in a choice set is
unaffected by changes in that choice set. In order to test for IID/IIA violations, a
Hausman-McFadden test was conducted5, which involves the construction of a
likelihood ratio test around different specifications of the same model where choice
alternatives are excluded. A χ 2 value of 75.14 was computed for a conditional logit
model when ‘‘Option B’’ alternative was excluded from the choice set. This value
exceeds the critical value (which from the Chi-squared table at 5% significance level

5

The statistic for this procedure is given by the following equation:

χ

2

⎛ β) − β)
⎜ s
f
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎠

' )
) ⎤ −1 ⎛ )
)
⎡∑ − ∑
β
− β ⎟⎞
⎜
⎢⎣ s
f ⎥⎦ ⎝ s
f ⎠

)
)
where β indicates the coefficient vector, ∑ denotes the estimated covariance matrix, and
f and s respectively the full and reduced choice specifications. This statistic follows a
limiting chi-squared distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of
attributes.
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with 5 degrees of freedom is 11.07). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected,
indicating an IIA problem.
When a violation of the IIA hypothesis is observed, more complex statistical models are
necessary in order to relax the assumptions employed. These include the multinomial
probit model (MNP) (Chen and Cosslett, 1998; Hausman and Wise, 1978; Lusk and
Schroeder, 2004), the random parameters logit model (Revelt and Train, 1998; Train,
1998; Train, 2003), the nested logit (Louviere et al., 2000), and the heterogeneous
extreme value logit (Allenby and Ginter, 1995; Bhat, 1995; Lusk and Schoroeder,
2004).
The approach that we follow in this analysis is the MNP. The MNP assumes that the
error term follows a multivariate normal distribution, with mean 0 and covariance
⎡ σ 12 σ 12
⎢
σ
σ 22
matrix, such that: ∑ = ⎢ 12
⎢ .
.
⎢
.
⎢⎣σ 1n

. σ 1n ⎤
⎥
. . ⎥
.
. . ⎥
⎥
. σ n2 ⎥⎦

(3)
Hausman and Wise (1978) proposed the structured covariance matrix for this model to
consider heterogeneity among individuals. Note that allowing the error variance to
differ across alternatives while errors are normally distributed is equivalent to relax the
restrictive IIA assumption.
When the errors are correlated, Train (2003) shows that the parameters in ∑ are not
identified unless constraints are imposed. These constraints are linked to the fact that
neither adding nor dividing a constant to the utility for each alternative will affect the
choice that is made according to equation (2). Then, we have to normalize the model to
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eliminate the irrelevance effects of the base level and scale of utility. To remove the first
effect, we use the resulting utility from taking the difference between each alternative’s
utility and the utility of the base alternative, in this case k. This means that:

η

ijk

= u −u
ij ijk

= β ⎛⎜ X − X ⎞⎟ + ⎛⎜ α − α ⎞⎟ S + ⎛⎜ ε − ε ⎞⎟
ik ⎠ ⎝ j
k ⎠ i ⎝ ij ik ⎠
⎝ ij
= βγ + δ S + ∈
ij* ij* i ij*
= λ +∈
ij* ij*
(4)
where j* = j if j < k and j* = j – 1 if j > k, so that j*= 1, ... , J-1. Now, we can work with

(

)

. For the second effect, we
the (J-1) × (J-1) covariance matrix ∑ for ∈* = ∈ ,...,∈
i
i1
i, J-1
fix the value of one of the variances6 σ m2 of ∑. Thus, there are a total of at most
J (J-1) 2 − 1 identifiable variance-covariance parameters. If each individual is a utility
maximizer, the probability that individual i chooses alternative k from a choice set to
any alternative J, can be expressed as:
⎡
⎤
P ⎡⎣ i choose k ⎤⎦ = P ⎢η ≤ 0,..., η
≤ 0⎥
i,J-1,k
⎣ i1k
⎦
⎡
⎤
≤ −λ
= P ⎢∈ ≤ − λ ,...,∈
i1
i,J-1,1
i,J-1,1 ⎥⎦
⎣ i1

(5)
More specifically the probabilities are written as:

6

We fit the model using STATA 10. By default, this program fixes one of the variances

to 2.
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P ⎡⎢ choose k = β , α , X , S , ∑ * ⎤⎥ =
j ij i
⎣
⎦
*
β ∗ X 1 + α1 ∗ S β ∗X j-1 +αj-1∗S * ⎛ *
f ⎜ ε ,..., ε * ⎟⎞ ∂ε * ,..., ε * ,
∫−∞
∫−∞
ij-1 ⎠ i1
ij-1
⎝ i1
(6)
where f ( ⋅) is the probability density function of the multivariate normal distribution.

4. Data

In this study, we analyze different management alternatives in the Spanish Biosphere
Reserve: Eo, Oscos y Terras de Burón. This Biosphere Reserve is an area in the
Northwest of the country on the scenic Cantabrian coastline between. In this reserve, the
Eo River estuary is an internationally recognized wetland under the RAMSAR treaty
and has sustainable development plans for its rational management. Livestock, forestry,
and tourism are currently the area’s main economic activities. Biosphere reserves are
designed to bring together a broad range of actors to work cooperatively towards
common objectives (UNESCO, 2005). In total, there are 553 Biosphere reserves
worldwide in 107 countries (UNESCO, 2009).
The designation of a Reserve does not carry any legal implications, although the
establishment of different actions to integrate biodiversity conservation and economic
development is expected. For policy purposes, the understanding of different
interventions is relevant, given that policymakers need to ensure better integration of
diverse community interests. With this objective in mind, we designed a choice
modeling survey that was presented to 453 individuals, from which 276 live inside the
Reserve and 177 in neighborhood areas. The survey was conducted face to face between
November 2008 and March 2009. The sample was restricted to individuals 18 years

11
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and older. The number of surveys in each city and village was determined by
proportional sampling weights.
The structure of this survey followed others previously conducted with similar
objectives. Its first part collected participant’s opinions about different social problems
and whether they visited the Reserve. The second section provided information to
participants about the Biosphere Reserve, to continue with additional questions about
the participant’s degree of approval with this designation, and various perception types
of questions with respect to some of the management actions presented. Then, the
different choice sets were presented, containing each two alternative programs and the
status quo option. We have included a status quo option, not only to differentiate
between protest and non-protest, but also because one of the options must always be in
the respondent’s currently feasible choice set in order to be able to interpret the results
in standard welfare economic terms (Hanley et al., 2001). In choice modeling, most
researchers have included the alternative “do nothing” or status quo (Adamowicz et al.,
1994; Adamowicz et al., 1997; Hearne and Santos, 2005, Blamey et al., 2000), although
others have not (Holmes et al., 1998, Mackenzie, 1993).
Table 2 describes the different attributes and the corresponding levels used in the
valuation scenario. The contained attributes are: reforestation actions, river and salmon
conservation actions, patrimonial and architectural restoration actions, and finally the
associated cost representing an increase on the current income tax level.

Table 2 around here

These attributes and levels were designed following the guidelines of the Biosphere
Reserve Councils. In order to test the understanding of survey participants, a pretest was
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conducted among 40 participants. Furthermore, and following the previous CV
literature, when the individuals selected the status quo option, follow up questions were
presented to identify if their no-votes were protests or real zeros. The set of presented
statements are displayed in Table 3, using the most common statements from previous
studies and an open-ended question recommended by some authors (Bateman et al.,
2002).

Table 3 around here

Finally, the last part of the survey contained ethical and socio-economic questions about
the respondent’s characteristics. Employing the criteria presented in Table 3, we have
identified different answers, which are displayed in Table 4. Using these results, we
have classified as "protest responses" those individuals who did not like the actions
presented, were not willing to pay more taxes, or who considered that they should not
have to pay for this type of program. In order to investigate the importance of these
protest responses, three classifications were attempted. On one hand, protest responses
were treated as zero respondents, and included into the dataset. Secondly, protest
responses were differentiated via the presented statements at each choice occasion, and
excluded from the sample; while in the third treatment, individuals providing any of the
protest reasons in any of the choice occasions were excluded from the sample.
Therefore, we have estimated three alternative models, one with the full sample with the
protest responses treated as true zeros; a second with protests classified by each choice
sets and excluded, and a third one, where in order to avoid inconstancies, responses
coming from the same individual were classified all as protests or not.

13
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Table 4 around here

5. Results

In total, 453 surveys were collected with an overall response rate of 40.27%. Each
individual responded to six choice occasions that amount to a total of 2718
observations. Surveys were conducted inside and outside the protected area, from a
sample of the general population. Table 5 summarizes the socio-demographic
characteristics of the sample.

Table 5 around here

The empirical representation of the utility function has the following functional form:
Va,b =β1Forest+β 2 River+β3 Wolf+β 4 Patrimony+β 5Tax+α a + α b ,

(7)
where α a and α b represent respectively the specific constants for selecting option A
and B respectively, with respect to the status quo (choice C). Table 6 presents the
results from this baseline model estimated with the sample. In this model, all the
attributes, except river, are statistically significant. The attributes forest, wolf and
patrimony have a positive sign, while the coefficient corresponding with the required
tax payment carries a negative one, as expected. This implies that the presence of the
former attributes increases utility, while the latter attribute decreases utility in a
statistically significant way.

Table 6 around here

14
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An extended model has been also estimated by introducing different socio-demographic
characteristics. With this extension, we can further analyze how individual
characteristics affect choice selection, so that the impact of socio-economic variables is
analyzed with respect to the status quo and choice of any of the two proposed programs.
In this case, the utility function is represented by the following expression:
Va,b =β1Wolf+β 2 Patrimony+β 3 River+β 4 Forest+β5Tax+α a1Reserve +

α a2 Farmer + α a3 Age + α a4 NoDegree + α a5 + α b1Reserve +
α b2 Farmer + α b3 Age + α b 4 NoDegree + α b5 ,
(8)
where the included socio-demographic variables are: Reserve, denoting whether the
surveys were carried out inside the Biosphere Reserve; Farmer, denoting that the
respondent was a farmer; Nodegree, representing individuals with the lowest education
level, and finally, age, providing information about the respondents’ age (age).
This extended specification improves the model’s goodness of fit. A log-likelihood ratio
test has been performed being the null hypothesis that all coefficients of the additional

(

)

2
=20.09 rejected. The results (table 6) show that
variables are zero LR=316.46,χ 0.01,8

when the individual is a farmer, the utility linked to the selection of an alternative
different from the status quo decreases. The same occurs when the individual has low
education, older age, or was interviewed inside the Biosphere Reserve. With respect to
the attributes’ coefficients, their significance levels and corresponding signs are
maintained. The only difference is the forest attribute significance level, which
increases from 10% to 1% significance level in this extended model.

15
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5.1. Identification of protest responses
As denoted, among the respondents who choose the status quo, we have identified the
protesters using the statements of table 3. We found that 53.9% of the individuals chose
the status quo in some occasion, and 37.3% always chose the status quo. Nearly 47% of
the total sample selected, in some choice occasion, made a statement that was classified
as protest response, and about 35% of the individuals were considered as protest in all
of their choices. The most important reason behind the protest responses is related to the
fact that participants consider that they are paying already enough taxes, while the true
zeros usually are not able to afford the payment for the program. We have classified the
protest responses by both individual and by choice sets. Through these classifications,
we have identified as protests, on the one hand, 1055 choices sets and, on the other, 212
individuals who in some of their elections have provided protest reasons. This fact
shows that in most occasions, when the status quo is chosen, this can be classified as a
protest response. Results are presented in table 4. In the next section, we compare
results according to the outlined classification.

5.2. Results with and without protest responses
Two additional MNP models for the corrected samples were estimated (table 7). When
classifying protest responses at the individual level, the sample is reduced to 241
individuals, affecting 1445 choice sets, while if the protesters are classified based on
choice sets, the remaining sample contains 1662 choice sets. The first two columns
show the results corresponding with the sample corrected by individual protest
responses, while the next correspond with the sample corrected by choices sets
protesters. The results show that the difference between both sets of estimates is mainly

16
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related to the significance of the attribute patrimony and the tax level, which are
statistically significant at the 0.1% and 1% significance level respectively, for the
sample corrected by choices set protests, and at the 10% significance level if the sample
is corrected at the individual level. The wolf and forest attributes have a positive effect
on the utility of individuals in both cases, while the attribute tax has a negative and
significant effect. In addition, in the entire sample, the river attribute is not significant,
although positive.

Table 7 around here

Comparing the results between both corrected samples and the full sample, we can
observe that there are no significant differences related to the magnitude and
significance levels of the coefficients, except those denoting the selection of alternatives
A and B with respect to the status quo. In the previous results employing the entire
sample these coefficients are not statistically significant. This implies that selection of a
particular alternative A or B does not increase the individual’s utility over the status quo
option. Nevertheless, in the corrected samples, these alternative indicators are positive
and statistically significant at the 0.1% level, showing statistical evidence that when an
individual chooses an alternative in which some actions are carried out, her/his utility
increases with respect to the status quo option. In terms of statistical fit, the corrected
models have also improved notably, minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).

5.3. WTP Estimates

17
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WTP estimates are computed with the formula in (9), while asymptotic standard errors
were obtained via the delta method for each attribute (table 8). The mean WTP for each
attribute was estimated as the ratio of the coefficient associated with the attribute of
interest over the Tax coefficient (see Hanemann and Kanninen 1999)7. Each of these
ratios is understood as a price change associated with a unit increase in a given attribute:
β
⎞
WTP = -1⎛⎜ attribute
β tax ⎟⎠
⎝

(9)

Tabla 8 around here

When excluding the protest responses, WTP estimates are not significantly different
across models. In fact, observing the confidence intervals, we can conclude that all the
intervals overlap. On average, the respondents of the entire sample are willing to pay
19.1 €/year for rehabilitation and restoration programs of patrimonial elements, while if
we exclude the protest responses, the corresponding WTP estimate reaches 20.96
€/year, and 21.22 €/year, respectively for the corrected sample by individual and
corrected choice sets protest. Finally, the wolf protection program has an associated
WTP of 10.97 €/year for the full sample and 17.54 €/year and 11.72 €/year without
individual and choice set protest responses. The lowest positive WTP is estimated for
the reforestation policy, ranging from 1.55 € for the total sample, and 1.60 €/year for the
sample corrected by individual protesters, and 1.43 €/year when corrected for choice
sets protests. To conclude, we can observe subtle differences with respect to the WTP

7

Following Lusk et al. (2003), we have multiplied by two the river, wolf and patrimony

coefficients, because of effects coding.
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estimates for actions to be implemented in the Reserve according to the treatment of
protest responses, only in the case of wolf protection when the sample is corrected by
individual protesters, the confidence interval does not overlap with the other cases.

6. Conclusions

In this research, we investigate the effects of protest responses in the results of a CE
exercise and the sensitivity of the derived WTP estimates. We estimate models
corrected and not corrected by protest responses, as well as an extended model with
socio-demographic characteristics by choice alternative. As far as we know, this is one
of the few applications using a multinomial probit model for modeling choice behavior.
The protest responses were classified by two rules, one at the individual level, and a
second one, considering them at the choice occasion level. The results show some
quantitative differences across treatments of protest responses. With respect to the
empirical objective at hand, we show the necessity that protest responses are identified
in choice experiment, given that the statistical model fit improves considerably,
providing more consistent results with the underlying economic theory. When the
sample is corrected by protest, the utility of selecting any of the alternatives versus
selecting the status quo, increases as expected according to individual’s rationality.
Therefore, the corrected models are more consistent with economic theory. In addition,
the valuation of some attributes, such as the wolf protection program vary slightly in
terms of welfare estimates, denoting that the presence of this attribute in the choice set
may trigger some protest responses. This finding makes sense in a geographical area
where wolf protection unleashes controversy.
In the context of contingent valuation, Halstead et al. (1992) show that the exclusion of
protest responses may bias WTP results, but the direction of such bias is indeterminate a
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priori. However, the majority of the studies indicate that samples without protest
bidders will result in higher WTP estimates (Jakobsson and Dragun 2001). The same
result has been found in this study employing CE. Therefore, estimation of WTP values
considering protest responses is necessary and can provide a range of estimates
producing more accurate results. At the same time, it seems that the identification of
protest responses should be done at the individual level instead of the choice level. In
terms of statistical accuracy, a better model fit can be confirmed for the corrected
protest model. Future research should therefore identify and treat protest responses in
the context of CE.
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Table 1. Examples of Statements Presented to Differentiate Between True Zeros
and Protest Responses in Different Studies

Giraud et al. (2002)
The expanded Steller sea lion program is not
worth this much money to me
I am not willing to pay this amount, but I
would be willing to pay $
It is unfair to expect me to pay for the
expanded Steller sea lion program
I believe that the expanded Steller sea lion
program will not help preserve this species
I do not want additional restrictions placed on
commercial fishing in this area
I am opposed to paying for more government
programs
The loss to the coastal Alaskan communities
and their economic livelihood is too large
The length of payment is too long; Other
Jakobsson and Dragun (2001)
The amount given is too high, but I would pay
$_ per year
I did not want to put a dollar value on
protecting plants and animals
Society has more important problems than
protecting plants and animals
Protecting plants and animals is not worth
anything to me
The government should protect plants and
animals using taxes already paid
Not enough information is given. I object to
the way the question is asked
I can’t afford to pay anything
Other
Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008)
I already pay enough for other things
Lower Saxony should cut public spending on
other things instead of expecting a voluntary
contribution from me
It is my right to have a high level of forest
biodiversity and not something I should have
to pay extra for
I refuse to assess nature in monetary terms
Those who enjoy biodiversity in forests should
pay for the measures
I do not have enough information about forest
conversion

Halstead et al. (1992)
The amount is too much; I would donate $__
per year over the next five year (please write in
the maximum dollar amount that you would
contribute)
The bald eagle should be preserved on New
England but the money should come from
taxes and licenses fees (from game species)
instead donations
The bald eagle is not worth anything to me
Bald eagle preservation is important to me but
I refuse to place a dollar value on it
Other, please explain
Loomis et al. (1996)

This program is not worth anything to me
I cannot afford to pay at this time
I do not think program would work
It is unfair to expect me to pay
I am opposed to new government programs
Fire is natural and benefits forest
Other

Strazzera et al. (2003)
Recreational benefits stemming from the forest
were not enough to warrant any payment
Budget constraints impose a restriction on
additional expenses
The method of payment (entry charge) is
considered inappropriate
It is unfair to charge for recreation in that
forest

Note: Meyerhoff and Liebe (2008): rated the statements with a five-point scale, from
completely disagree (1) to completely agree (5).
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Table 2. Attributes, levels and status quo

Attribute (Variable)

Levels

Status quo

5% increment on
forest or 5400ha

Forest program (Forest)

0 ha

20% increment on
forest or 21000ha
Yes, if cleaning and
restoration actions are
River and salmon program (River)

No
undertaken
No, otherwise
yes , if rehabilitation
of architectural

Rehabilitation patrimonial program

cultural heritage is
No

(Patrimony)

undertaken

No, otherwise
Yes, if management
actions for wolf
Wolf program management (Wolf)

No
recovery is undertaken
No, otherwise
15 € increment on tax
over current levels

Tax (Tax)

0€
30 €
50 €
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Table 3. Statements Presented to Differentiate Between True Zeros and Protest
Response in Our Survey

These actions are interesting, but nowadays I can’t afford this payment
I don’t like the actions to be undertaken (Why?):
It is not fair that I have to pay to protect the Biosphere Reserve, because I pay enough taxes
already
Another reason (indicate):
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Table 4. Number of Observation per Stated Motives

Classified
Motives to choose the status quo option

Choices

Individuals

as Protest
response

These actions are interesting, but nowadays I can’t
482

87

No

afford the payment
I don’t like the presented actions (Why?)

No

I don´t like the different combinations

32

19

No

I don´t like the different levels

5

2

No

97

38

Yes

952

177

Yes

I don’t like a specific action such as wolf recovery
or forest restoration
It is not fair that I have to pay to protect the
Biosphere Reserve, because I pay enough taxes
Other reason (indicate)

No
Too expensive

18

16

No

People should not have to pay for these actions

7

2

Yes
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Table 5. Socio Economic Characteristics of the Different Treatments

Socio economic

Sample Corrected

Sample Corrected

Full

Reference

characteristics

by Choices Set

by Individual

Sample

Population

Protest Responses

Protest Responses

48.06

47.85

52.40

47.80

No degree

2.41

2.49

6.18

2.05

Primary

30.13

24.80

39.96

49.86

Secondary

20.20

21.16

17.66

32.00

Practical trainer

18.34

18.67

14.35

6.84

Tertiary

28.08

29.46

21.85

9.24

DK

0.84

0.41

1.32

Male

50.93

51.04

47.68

48.47

Female

49.07

48.96

52.32

51.53

Income<400

1.08

1.24

0.88

3.78

>=400<600

2.22

2.49

2.43

12.08

>=600<1000

6.67

7.05

7.95

14.48

>=1000<1500

37.40

34.02

47.02

21.55

>=1500<2000

24.59

25.73

21.41

16.38

>=2000<2500

11.67

12.86

8.83

10.22

>=2500<3000

7.64

7.47

5.52

8.81

>=3000<4000

5.41

6.22

3.75

7.59

>=4000

3.31

2.90

2.21

5.12

Average age
Studies

Sex
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Table 6. Results for Baseline Model and Expanded Model. Entire Sample

Attribute

Forest
River
Wolf
Patrimony
Tax

Baseline model

Extended model

Coefficient

Coefficient

(Std. Err.)

(Std. Err.)

0.025*

0.027**

(0.010)

(0.010)

-0.058

-0.052

(0.048)

(0.051)

0.091**

0.094**

(0.032)

(0.032)

0.158**

0.167**

(0.054)

(0.055)

-0.017**

-0.017**

(0.006)

(0.006)

Alternative A
Reserve
Farmer
Age
No degree
_cons

-0.157*
-

(0.071)
-0.780***

-

(0.175)
-0.026***

-

(0.002)
-0.996***

-

(0.172)

-0.177

1.398***

(0.158)

(0.257)

Alternative B
Reserve
Farmer

-0.130*
-

(0.061)
-0.699***

-

(0.172)
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Age
No degree

-0.022***
-

(0.004)
-0.760***

-

(0.181)

-0.016

1.284***

(0.089)

(0.282)

-2628.6962

-2470.4682

AIC

5275.392

4974.936

BIC

5338.446

5094.037

Wald test

15.26

268.68

p-value

0.0093

0.000

Individuals

453

453

Observations

8154

8151

Number of choices sets

2718

2717

_cons
Log simulated-likelihood

Variable Definition:
Reserve
Farmer

=1 if surveys were carried out inside the Reserve; =0 if
outside
=1 if respondents are ranchers, farmers or forest owners;
=0 other

Age
No degree

Age of respondent
=1 if respondents have formal educational levels below
primary studies; = 0 otherwise

Note: ***, **, * = Coefficients significantly different from zero at 0.1%; 1%; and 10%
significance level.
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Table 7. Results for Sample Corrected by Individual and by Choice Sets Protest

Attribute

Without protest

Without protest

(individual)

(choices)

Coefficient

Z

(Std. Err.)
Forest
River
Wolf
Patrimony
Tax

0.028

Coefficient

Z

(Std. Err.)
0.034

1.94*

(0.014)
0.045

2.42*

(0.014)
0.082

(0.095)

0.47

0.153

(0.099)

0.82

0.140

(0.074)

2.07*

0.183

(0.063)

2.21*

0.254

(0.078)

2.36*

-0.017

(0.076)

3.34***

-0.024

(0.008)

-2.06*

(0.009)

-2.81**

Alternative A
_cons

1.173

1.057

(0.227)

5.18***

(0.223)

4.75***

Alternative B
_cons
Log simulated-likelihood

1.106

0.958

(0.242)

4.57***

(0.237)

4.04***

-1107.1048

-1247.3967

AIC

2232.21

2512.793

BIC

2289.58

2571.423

Wald test

9.38

23.45

p-value

0.095

0.0003

Individuals

241

296

Observations

4335

4986

Number of choices sets

1445

1662
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Table 8. Willingness to Pay Estimates for the Three Samples

Without protest

Without protest

(individual)

(choices)

Entire Sample

WTP

95% C.I.

WTP

95% C.I.

WTP

95% C.I.

Forest

1.55

(1.36, 1.75)

1.60

(1.37,1.82)

1.43

(1.17, 1.69)

Wolf

10.97

(8.76, 13.17)

17.54

(15.16, 19.92)

11.72

(9.16, 14.27)

Patrimony

19.1

(17.86, 20.36)

20.96

(18.47, 23.46)

21.22

(18.93, 23.52)
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